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Abstract
The Australian Government uses the means-test as a way of managing the pension
budget. Changes in Age Pension policy impose difficulties in retirement modelling due
to policy risk, but any major changes tend to be ‘grandfathered’ meaning that current
retirees are exempt from the new changes. In 2015, two important changes were made
in regards to allocated pension accounts – the income means-test is now based on
deemed income rather than account withdrawals, and the income-test deduction no
longer applies. We examine the implications of the new changes in regards to optimal
decisions for consumption, investment, and housing. We account for regulatory mini-
mum withdrawal rules that are imposed by regulations on allocated pension accounts,
as well as the 2017 asset-test rebalancing. The new policy changes are modelled in a
utility maximizing lifecycle model and solved as an optimal stochastic control prob-
lem. We find that the new rules decrease the benefits from planning the consumption
in relation to the means-test, while the housing allocation increases slightly in order
to receive additional Age Pension. The difference in optimal drawdown between the
old and new policy are only noticeable early in retirement until regulatory minimum
withdrawal rates are enforced. However, the amount of extra Age Pension received for
many households is now significantly different due to the new deeming income rules,
which benefit slightly wealthier households who previously would receive no Age Pen-
sion due to the income-test and minimum withdrawals.
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1 Introduction
Australia relies on a defined-contribution pension system that is based on the superannuation
guarantee, private savings, and a government provided Age Pension. The superannuation
guarantee mandates that employers contribute a set percentage of the employee’s gross
earnings to a superannuation fund, which accumulates and is invested until retirement. The
current contribution rate is set to 9.5%, where contributions in addition to this often comes
with tax benefits. Private savings comprise of these contributions, but also include savings
outside the superannuation fund such as investment accounts, dwelling, and other assets.
Finally, the Age Pension is a government managed safety net which provides the retiree
with a means-tested Age Pension. This means-test determines whether the retiree qualifies
for full, partial, or no Age Pension once the entitlement age is reached. In the means-test,
income and assets are evaluated individually, and a certain taper rate reduces the maximum
payments once income or assets surpass set thresholds (which are subject to family status
and homeownership). Income from different sources are also treated differently; financial
assets are expected to generate income based on a progressive deeming rate, while income
streams such as labor and non account-based annuity payments are assessed based on their
nominal value.
Since the Australian retirement system is relatively young, the long-term effects of this
new pension system are not yet known. Changes in this system are expected to occur
frequently due to fiscal reasons, and once the effects policy changes have on a retiree’s
personal wealth (and the economy in general) becomes evident. Variables directly related
to the means-test such as entitlement age, means-test thresholds, taper rates, and pension
payments can all be adjusted to meet budget needs by the government. On a larger scale,
regulatory changes may include whether the family home is included in the means-tested
assets, the elimination of minimum withdrawal1 rules, changes in mandatory savings rates,
or additional taxes on superannuation savings. From a mathematical modelling perspective,
this poses difficulties in terms of future model validity, as regulatory risk and policy changes
can quickly make a model obsolete if it is not modified to account for the new rules.
The motivation for this paper was the recent changes for allocated pension accounts,
where assets now generate a deemed income and which no longer have an income-test de-
duction. Account-based pensions (such as allocated pension accounts) are accounts that have
been purchased with superannuation and generate an income stream throughout retirement.
Prior to 2015, these types of accounts allowed for an income-test deduction that was deter-
mined upon account opening, and withdrawals were considered to be income in the means-
test. The income-test deduction allowed the retiree to withdraw slightly more every year
without missing out on Age Pension. However, in 2015 the rules changed. Existing accounts
were ‘grandfathered’ and will continue to be assessed under the old rules, while the new rules
will be applied to any new accounts. The argument for the changes were simplicity (people
with the same level of assets should be treated the same no matter how they are invested), to
increase incentive to maximize total disposable income rather than maximizing Age Pension
payments, and to level how capital growth and interest paying investments were assessed
(Australian Government Department of Families and Affairs, 2016). From a fiscal point of
view, the recommendations to introduce the new rules were based on estimated unchanged
costs2 (Henry, 2009), however the 2015-2016 budget stated expected savings of $57m for
1Certain account types for retirement savings have a minimum withdrawal rate once the owner is retired.
2The recommendations to introduce deeming was made in Henry (2009) where the fiscal sustainability is
evaluated with the general equilibrium model ‘KPMG Econtech MM900’ (KPMG, 2010). The model shows
the estimation over a 10-year window hence we do not know the short term or year-to-year estimates. In
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2015-2016, and $129m and $136m for subsequent years (The Commonwealth of Australia,
2015). The Age Pension post in the 2015-2016 budget includes all changes to the Age
Pension in a combined viewpoint, so a specific impact of the deeming rule changes is not
known. We adapt the model previously developed in Andreasson et al. (2016) to examine
the impact of this policy change on an individual retiree. The model used is an extension
with stochastic factors (mortality, risky investments and sequential family status), to what
was originally presented in Ding (2013); Ding et al. (2014), which is an expected utility
model for the retirement behavior in the decumulation phase of Australian retirees subject
to consumption, housing, investment, bequest and government provided means-tested Age
Pension.
Problems with decisions that span over multiple time periods are typically modelled with
lifecycle models and solved with backward recursion (Cocco et al., 2005; Cocco and Gomes,
2012; Blake et al., 2014 to name a few). While there is a plethora of research on the subject
internationally, there is still rather limited research modelling the Australian Age Pension,
and even less that enforces the minimum withdrawal rules. The original model in Ding (2013)
does not constrain drawdown with minimum withdrawal, which would limit the author from
finding a closed form solution. Similarly, other authors that focus on means-tested pension
also do not enforce minimum withdrawal rates, such as Hulley et al. (2013) who use CRRA
utility to understand consumption and investment behavior, or Iskhakov et al. (2015) who
investigate how annuity purchases changes in relation to Age Pension. It should be noted
that their assumptions do not include Allocated Pension accounts, thus minimum withdrawal
rates may not apply. There is surprisingly limited research conducted on implications of
the regulatory minimum withdrawal rates, even though a large number of retirees are using
such accounts (or similar phased withdrawal products). The exception is Bateman et al.
(2007), who compare the welfare of retirees when the current minimum withdrawal rates
were introduced 2007 against the previous rules and alternative drawdown strategies. The
authors use a rather simple CRRA model to examine the effect of different risk aversion and
investment strategies but find that the minimum withdrawal rules increase the welfare for
retirees although slightly less than optimal drawdown does. In Andreasson et al. (2016) the
minimum withdrawal rules are included in part of the model outcome, but is by no means
exhaustive and only provides a brief introduction to the effects.
The minimum withdrawal rules are designed to exhaust the retiree’s account around year
100, however after year 85 (subject to investment returns) the withdrawn dollar amount
starts decreasing quickly. In a recent report from Plan For Life (2016) it is identified that
only 5% of retirees exhaust their accounts completely, though this number is expected to
increase as life expectancy increases and the population ages. They find that retirees tend to
follow the minimum withdrawal rules as guidelines for their own withdrawal, as few withdraw
more than the minimum amount. This is further confirmed in Shevchenko (2016). Even
so, Rice Warner (2015) argues that the minimum withdrawal rates should be cut by 25-
50% to prevent retirees from exhausting their superannuation prematurely due to increased
longevity. The current rates are simply too high for many retirees, thus is not sustainable
for people living longer than the average life expectancy, and are significantly higher than
what is optimal in Andreasson et al. (2016).
The contribution of this paper is to improve the understanding of the effect the new policy
rules, and with minimum withdrawal enforced, has on a typical retiree’s optimal decisions.
Both policy rules are implemented in a utility maximization model with stochastic mortality
and risky investments, as well as sequential family status, which explains the behavior of
addition to this, the model includes additional suggested tax and budget related changes, hence the effect
of introducing deeming rates cannot be isolated.
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Australian retirees well. We then examine the differences in optimal decisions between an
allocated pension account opened prior to 2015 with the one opened post 2015, as well
as compare with the planned 2017 asset-test adjustments and the previous results where
minimum withdrawal is not enforced. The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2
we summarize the model and present the Age Pension function, as well as explain the
parameterization. Section 3 contains a discussion of the results. Finally, in Section 4 we
present our concluding remarks.
2 Model
The model utilized is from Andreasson et al. (2016), where the Age Pension function has
been updated to account for the policy changes in 2015. For a complete description of the
model, its calibration to the data and numerical solution, and a discussion of the construction
and assumptions, please see the reference.
The objective of the retiree is to maximize expected utility generated from consumption,
housing, and bequest. The retiree starts off with a total wealth W, and at the time of
retirement t = t0 is given the option to allocate wealth into housing H (and if he already is
a homeowner, the option to adjust current allocation by up- or downsizing). The remaining
(liquid) wealth Wt0 = W −H is placed in an allocated pension account, which is a type of
account that does not have a tax on investment earnings and is subject to the regulatory
minimum withdrawal rates. A retiree can either start as a couple or single household, where
this information is contained in a family state variable
Gt ∈ G = {∆, 0, 1, 2}, (1)
where ∆ corresponds to the agent already deceased at time t, 0 corresponds to the agent
died during (t − 1, t], 1 and 2 correspond to the agent being alive at time t in a single or
couple households respectively. Evolution in time of the family state variable Gt is subject
to survival probabilities. In the case of a couple household, there is a risk each time period
that one of the spouses passes away, in which case it is treated as a single household model
for the remaining years.
At the start of each year t = t0, t0+1..., T −1 the retiree will receive a means-tested Age
Pension Pt, and decide what amount of saved liquid wealth Wt will be used for consumption
(defined as proportion drawdown αt of liquid wealth), and the proportion δt of remaining
liquid wealth that will be invested in risky assets. The change in wealth after the decision
to next period is then defined as
Wt+1 = [Wt − αtWt]
[
δte
Zt+1 + (1− δt)e
rt
]
, (2)
where Zt+1 is the stochastic return on risky assets modelled as independent and identically
distributed random variables from Normal distribution N (µ−r˜, σ) with mean µ−r˜, variance
σ2 and inflation3 rate r˜. Any wealth not allocated to risky assets is assumed to generate
a deterministic real risk-free return rt (risk-free interest rate adjusted for inflation). Each
period the agent receives utility based on the current state of family status Gt:
Rt(Wt, Gt, αt, H) =

UC(Ct, Gt, t) + UH(H,Gt), if Gt = 1, 2,
UB(Wt), if Gt = 0,
0, if Gt = ∆.
(3)
3By defining the model in real terms (adjusted for inflation), time-dependent variables do not have to
include inflation which otherwise would be an additional stochastic variable.
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That is if the agent is alive he receives reward (utility) based on consumption UC and housing
UH , if he died during the year the reward comes from the bequest UB, and if he is dead there
is no reward. Note that the reward received when the agent is alive depends on whether
the family state is a couple or single household due to differing utility parameters and Age
Pension thresholds.
Finally, t = T is the maximum age of the agent beyond which survival is deemed impos-
sible, and the terminal reward function is given as
R˜(WT , GT ) =
{
UB(WT ), if GT ≥ 0,
0, if GT = ∆.
(4)
The retiree has to find the decisions that maximize expected utility with respect to the
decisions for consumption, investment, and housing. This is defined as a stochastic control
problem, where decisions (controls) at time t depend on stochastic variable realization at
time t but where future realizations are unknown. The problem can be defined as
max
H
[
sup
α,δ
E
α,δ
t0
[
βt0,T R˜(WT , GT ) +
T−1∑
t=t0
βt0,tRt(Wt, Gt, αt, H)
]]
, (5)
where Eα,δt0 [·] is the expectation conditional on information at time t = t0 if we use control
α = (αt0 , αt0+1, ..., αT−1) and δ = (δt0 , δt0+1, ..., δT−1) for t = t0, t0 + 1, ..., T − 1. The
subjective discount rate βt,t′ is a proxy for personal impatience between time t and t
′. This
problem can be solved numerically with dynamic programming by using backward induction
of the Bellman equation. The state variables are discretized on a grid, and the Gaussian
Quadrature method is used for integration between periods; for details, see Andreasson et al.
(2016).
2.1 Utility functions
Utility in the model is measured with time-separable additive functions based on the com-
monly used HARA utility function, subject to different utility parameters for singles and
couples, as follows.
• Consumption preferences. It is assumed that utility comes from consumption
exceeding the consumption floor, weighted with a time-dependent health status proxy4.
The utility function for consumption is defined as
UC(Ct, Gt, t) =
1
ψt−t0γd
(
Ct − cd
ζd
)γd
, d =
{
C, if Gt = 2 (couple),
S, if Gt = 1 (single),
(6)
where γd ∈ (−∞, 0) is the risk aversion and cd is the consumption floor parameters.
The scaling factor ζd normalizes the utility a couple receives in relation to a single
household. The utility parameters γd, cd and ζd are subject to family state Gt, hence
will have different values for couple and single households. Also, ψ ∈ [1,∞) is the
utility parameter for the health status proxy, which controls the declining consumption
between current time t and time of retirement t0.
4Note that the purpose is not to model health among the retirees, but rather to explain decreasing
consumption with age.
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• Bequest preferences. Utility is also received from luxury bequest, hence the home
is not included in the bequest (Ding et al., 2014). The utility function for bequest is
then defined as
UB(Wt) =
(
θ
1− θ
)1−γS ( θ
1−θ
a+Wt
)γS
γS
, (7)
where Wt is the liquid assets available for bequest, and γS the risk aversion parameters
for single households5. The parameter θ ∈ [0, 1) is the degree of altruism which controls
the preference of bequest over consumption, and a ∈ R+ is the threshold for luxury
bequest up to where the retiree leaves no bequest6.
• Housing preferences. The utility from owning a home comes in the form of pref-
erences over renting but is approximated by the home value. The housing utility is
defined as
UH(H,Gt) =
1
γH
(
λdH
ζd
)γH
, (8)
where γH is the risk aversion parameter for housing (allowed to be different from risk
aversion for consumption and bequest), ζd is the same scaling factor as in equation (6),
H > 0 is the market value of the family home at time of purchase t0 and λd ∈ (0, 1] is
the preference of housing defined as a proportion of the market value.
2.2 Age Pension
The Age Pension policy changes over time, and all income streams of allocated pension
accounts opened after the 1st January 2015 are assumed to generate deemed income. Ac-
counts opened prior to this are ‘grandfathered’ hence will continue to be assessed under the
old rules (Australian Government Department of Families and Affairs, 2016), where instead
drawdown is considered income.
The Age Pension rules state that the entitlement age is 65 for both males and females,
with the means-test thresholds and taper rates for July 2016 presented in Table 1 and
discussed in detail later in this section. The new rules have introduced a ‘Work bonus’
deduction for the income-test, but as the model assumes the retiree is no longer in the
workforce this has been left out.
2.2.1 Deemed income
Deemed income refers to the assumed returns from financial assets, without reference to the
actual returns on the assets held. The deemed income only applies to financial assets and
account based income streams and is calculated as a progressive rate of assets. The income-
test can therefore depend on both labor income (if any), deemed income from financial
investments not held in the allocated pension account, drawdown from allocated pension
accounts if opened prior to 2015, or deemed income on such accounts if opened after January
1st 2015.
5The risk aversion is considered to be the same as consumption risk aversion for singles since a couple is
expected to become a single household before bequeathing assets.
6Because the marginal utility is constant for the bequest utility with zero wealth, in a model with perfect
certainty and CRRA utility the optimal solution will suggest consumption up to level a before it is optimal
to save wealth for bequest (Lockwood, 2014).
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Table 1: Age Pension rates published by Centrelink as at September 2016.
Single Couple
P dmax Full Age Pension per annum $22,721 $34,252
Income-Test
LdI Threshold $4,264 $7,592
̟dI Rate of Reduction $0.5 $0.5
Asset-Test
L
d,h=1
I Threshold: Homeowners $209,000 $296,500
L
d,h=0
I Threshold: Non-homeowners $360,500 $448,000
̟dA Rate of Reduction $0.039 $0.039
Deeming Income
κd Deeming Threshold $49,200 $81,600
ς− Deeming Rate below κ
d 1.75% 1.75%
ς+ Deeming Rate above κ
d 3.25% 3.25%
The deeming rates are subject to change in relation to interest rates and stock market
performance7. Two different deeming rates may apply based on the value of the account;
a lower rate ς− for assets under the deeming threshold κd and a higher rate ς+ for assets
exceeding the threshold, as shown in Table 1.
2.2.2 Age Pension function
The Age Pension received is modelled with respect to the current liquid assets, where the
account value is used for the asset-test. Since the model assumption states that no labor
income is possible, all income for the income-test comes from either deemed income (new
rules) or generated from withdrawals of liquid assets (old rules). The Age Pension function
can thus be defined as
Pt := f(Wt) = max
[
0,min
[
P dmax,min [PA, PI]
]]
, (9)
where P dmax is the full Age Pension, PA is the asset-test and PI is the income-test functions.
The PA function is the same for rules prior and post 2015, and is defined as
PA := P
d
max − (Wt − L
d,h
A )̟
d
A, (10)
where Ld,hA is the threshold for the asset-test and ̟
d
A the taper rate for assets exceeding the
thresholds. Superscript d is a categorical index indicating couple or single household status
as defined in equation (6). The variables are subject to whether it is a single or couple
household, and the threshold for the asset-test is also subject to whether the household is a
homeowner or not (h = {0, 1}). Although the PA function is the same for both the old and
new policies, the PI function is different. For the new policy rules, it can be written as
PI := P
d
max − (PD(Wt)− L
d
I )̟
d
I , (11)
PD(Wt) = ς−min
[
Wt, κ
d
]
+ ς+max
[
0,Wt − κ
d
]
, (12)
where Ldi is the threshold for the income-test and ̟
d
I the taper rate for income exceeding
the threshold. PD(Wt) calculates the deemed income, where κd is the deeming threshold,
7The current rates are at a historical low. In 2008 the deeming rates ς−/ς+ were as high as 4%/6%,
but in March 2013 they were set to 2.5%/4% due to decreasing interest rates, then in November 2013 to
2%/3.5% and to current levels of 1.75%/3.25% in March 2015.
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and ς− and ς+ are the deeming rates that apply to assets below and above the deeming
threshold respectively.
Under the previous policy, the PI function is defined as
PI := P
d
max − (αtWt −M(t)− L
d
I )̟
d
I , (13)
M(t) =
Wt0
et0
(1 + r˜)t0−t, (14)
where the functionM(t) represents the income-test deduction that was available for accounts
opened prior to 2015, et0 is the lifetime expected at age t0 and r˜ the inflation. As the model
is defined in real terms, the future income-test deductions must discount inflation. Current
values of the function parameters are given in Table 1.
2.3 Parameters
The model parameters are taken from Andreasson et al. (2016), where calibration was per-
formed on empirical data from Australian Bureau of Statistics (2011). However, the con-
sumption floor cd and the threshold for luxury bequest a must be adjusted as they represent
monetary values. Since the previous model was defined in real terms, we need to set a
new base year for the comparison. We therefore adjust these parameters based on the Age
Pension adjustments from 2010 to 2016. Currently, the Age Pension payments are adjusted
to the higher of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and Male Average Weekly Total Earnings
(MTAWE). The increase in full Age Pension payments from 2010 to 2016 equals approxi-
mately 4.5% increase per year. We assume that the utility parameters representing monetary
values have increased in the same manner. All utility model parameter values are shown in
Table 2.
Table 2: Model parameter values adjusted for 2016
γd γH θ a cd ψ λ ζd
Single household -1.98 -1.87 0.96 $27,200 $13,284 1.18 0.044 1.0
Couples household -1.78 -1.87 0.96 $27,200 $20,607 1.18 0.044 1.3
On the 1st of January 2017 the thresholds of the asset-test will be ‘rebalanced’, hence will
change significantly (Australian Government Department of Veterans’ Affairs, 2016). The
thresholds for the asset-test-will be increased and the taper rate ̟dA will double. This
effectively means that retirees will receive full Age Pension for a higher level of wealth, but
once the asset-test binds, the partial Age Pension will decrease twice as fast, causing them
to receive no Age Pension at a lower level of wealth than before. At the time of writing
of this paper there are no proposed adjustments to the full Age Pension or income-test
threshold for January 2017, hence these Age Pension parameters do not have to be adjusted
other than updating the asset-test thresholds and taper rate according to the changes. The
parameters for the Age Pension in 2016 are shown in Table 1, and the 2017 Age Pension
parameters for the updated asset-test are shown in Table 3. In addition to this, we set the
following.
• A retiree is eligible for Age Pension at age t = 65 and lives no longer than T = 100.
• Real risky returns follow Zt ∼ N (0.056, 0.133), and the real risk-free rate is set to
rt = 0.005. These parameters were estimated from S&P/ASX 200 Total Return and
the deposit rate (Andreasson et al., 2016).
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• The lower threshold for housing is set to $30,000. A retiree with wealth below this
level can therefore not be a homeowner, hence H ∈ {0, [30000,W]}.
• A unisex survival probability is used to avoid separating the sexes. The survival
probabilities for a couple are assumed to be mutually exclusive, based on the oldest
partner in the couple. The actual mortality probabilities are taken from Life Tables
published in Australian Bureau of Statistics (2014).
• The subjective discount rate β is set in relation to the real interest rate so that βt,t′ =
e−
∑
t
′
i=t
ri.
Table 3: Planned 2017 Age Pension rates published by Centrelink as at September 2016
(https://www.humanservices.gov.au/customer/services/centrelink/age-pension).
Single Couple
Asset-Test
L
d,h=1
I Threshold: Homeowners $250,000 $375,000
L
d,h=0
I Threshold: Non-homeowners $450,000 $575,000
̟dA Rate of Reduction $0.078 $0.078
Minimum withdrawal rates for allocated pension accounts are shown in Table 4 (Australian Taxation Office
2016). The rates impose a lower bound on optimal consumption, hence withdrawals from
liquid wealth must be larger or equal to these rates.
Table 4: Minimum regulatory withdrawal rates for allocated pension accounts for
the year 2016 and onwards (https://www.ato.gov.au/rates/key-superannuation-rates-and-
thresholds/ ).
Age ≤ 64 65-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 95 ≤
Min. drawdown 4% 5% 6% 7% 9% 11% 14%
3 Results
In the income-test, the policy change to replace asset drawdown with deemed income leads
to some interesting implications for the retirees in all three decision variables (housing,
consumption, and risky asset allocation). The main difference is that assets are now included
twice in the means-test, as the income-test is now based on assets only rather than the actual
drawdown of assets. Optimal decisions are then becoming more sensitive to changes in liquid
assets, although the retiree has now less control to optimize utility in relation to the Age
Pension.
Below we present and compare results for optimal decisions under the old rules (‘Pre
2015’), new deeming rules for income-test (‘Post 2015’), and new deeming rules with the
new asset test (‘Post 2015, new asset test’) that starts in 2017.
3.1 Optimal Consumption
The optimal consumption consists of the drawdown from liquid wealth and the Age Pension
received, and exemplifies a behavior consistent with traditional utility models (Figure 1).
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The curve is generally a smooth, concave, and monotone function of wealth hence becomes
flatter as wealth increases due to decreasing marginal utility. The curve becomes flatter as
the retiree ages, which is the desired effect from the model’s health proxy as to reflect the
lower consumption resulting from decreasing health. However, this general behavior starts
to deviate as the retiree ages due to the minimum withdrawal rates. For a retiree aged
65 with an account of $500,000, the optimal consumption for a couple is roughly 11.1%
which is more than the minimum withdrawal rate of 5% (Table 4). As the retiree ages his
consumption tends to decrease, but around age 85 the minimum withdrawal rates crosses
over the optimal consumption hence the drawdown curve becomes proportional to wealth.
This deviation occurs at an even earlier age for wealthier retirees.
Optimal Consumption for Couple Households
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Figure 1: Optimal drawdown and consumption for non-homeowner couple households
under the three different policy scenarios.
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Optimal Consumption for Single Households
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Figure 2: Optimal drawdown and consumption for non-homeowner single households
under the three different policy scenarios.
Age Pension only contributes to the consumption, rather than being a means of planning
for optimizing utility or amount of Age Pension received. This is in contrast to the results in
Andreasson et al. (2016) with the policy rules prior to 2015, which showed that drawdown
was highly sensitive to the means-test and could be utilized in financial planning (right
column in Figure 1). There is a marginal effect when the retiree goes from no Age Pension
to receiving partial Age Pension, especially for the 2017 asset-test adjustment, shown as a
tiny dent where the consumption and drawdown curve intersect (the threshold between no
pension and partial pension due to asset-test). This implies that a retiree should consume
slightly more when his wealth is close to this threshold in order to receive partial Age
Pension, but the additional utility would be so small that it is negligible in planning. Another
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level where such an optimizing decision would be expected is when the income-test binds
over the asset-test (the threshold between partial pension due to income-test and asset-
test). It occurs around $508,066 for single households without a family home ($248,352 for
homeowners) and $574,242 for couple households ($314,527 for homeowners), and can be
seen as a slight change in the drawdown curve due to different taper rates for the partial
Age Pension. No apparent effect is identified in the consumption however, hence this would
provide no additional utility. Note that as the retiree ages, and the minimum withdrawal
rate is higher than the unconstrained optimal consumption, Age Pension simply adds to
the consumption rather than being included in desired consumption. This is in line with
Bateman et al. (2007), which finds that welfare decreases slightly when minimum withdrawal
rules are enforced over unconstrained optimal withdrawals, especially for higher levels of risk
aversion.
An interesting outcome is when the consumption paths over a lifetime are compared with
the new and old rules (Figure 3). Since the optimal drawdown rules are very similar before
and after the change, and minimum withdrawal rates quickly binds, the consumption in turn
follows the same pattern. However, since the income-test is now based on deemed income,
more Age Pension is received in relation to wealth and drawdown assuming the deeming
rates stay constant. This is especially true at older ages. Figure 4 clearly shows the difference
in Age Pension payments, where the new rules lead to more partial Age Pension (but less for
wealthier households in the 2017 asset-test adjustment). As the withdrawal rate increases
the difference in partial Age Pension increases as well. One of the reasons for changing
the policy was for the government generate savings, but the deeming rules will not have
the desired outcome on allocated pension accounts unless the deeming rates increase. Only
when the minimum withdrawals are removed (or at least decreased), which in turn could
lead to lower withdrawals for given wealth levels, could current rates lead to Age Pension
payments being less under the new policy8. The effect can clearly be seen in Figure 3. Under
the old rules, the relatively high drawdown (income) for the retiree would most often lead to
no Age Pension due to the income-test, while under the new rules the retiree would receive
a significant amount of Age Pension over his lifespan. Wealth paths throughout retirement,
however, are almost identical - the difference between the new and old policy is solely in
consumption from additional Age Pension.
3.2 Optimal risky asset allocation
The exposure to risky assets in the portfolio is highly dependent on wealth and age, and
even more so compared to the old rules. This is expected since the means-test is now based
on wealth in both the asset and the income-test, which means investment returns will have a
larger impact on expected utility. The risky allocation displays similar characteristics as the
older rules and can be explained with the expected marginal utility conditional on wealth.
When marginal utility increases with wealth, the risky allocation will always suggest 100%
risky assets. This is the case for the black bottom area (Figure 5-8), where the upper bound
to the left indicates the maximum marginal utility from consumption, and the upper bound
to the right is the maximum marginal utility from bequest. If utility from consumption
is considered individually, then lower levels of wealth will have higher marginal utility. If
marginal utility from bequest is instead isolated, the same effect will occur albeit at a
higher level than for consumption (∼ $450,000). It is, therefore, optimal up to these levels
8It should be noted that the findings are for the account-based pension only, as other products which
do not enforce the minimum withdrawal rates could incur additional savings for the government under the
new rules.
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Figure 3: Comparison of consumption, Age Pension and wealth over a retiree’s lifetime
with the three different policy scenarios and with unconstrained (no minimum withdrawal)
optimal consumption. The retiree starts with $1m liquid wealth which grows with the
expected return each year, and drawdown follows the optimal drawdown paths under each
policy.
to allocate 100% to risky assets, as the reward is larger than the risk.
The marginal utility is also affected by the means-test, as a result of the ‘buffer’ effect.
This buffer occurs when the decreasing wealth that stems from an investment loss is partially
offset via increased Age Pension and can be seen as the comparatively darker area around
the upper white line (indicating where partial pension becomes no pension) in Figure 5 or
7. The buffer effect is, therefore, strongest for a retiree who has no Age Pension but is close
to receiving partial Age Pension. An investment loss, in this instance, would be offset by
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Figure 4: Comparison of the Age Pension function with the three policy scenarios. The
retiree is a single household aged 65-74 and consumption is assumed to be the minimum
withdrawal rate of 5%.
partial Age Pension, whereas an investment profit would not cause the retiree to miss out
on Age Pension that he would otherwise receive. The taper rate is steeper for the asset-test
than the income-test (especially for 2017), hence marginal utility is lower when the asset-
test is binding. For very low levels of wealth, the buffer effect is the opposite; investment
losses can never lead to more than full Age Pension, and investment profits will decrease
the amount of partial Age Pension received, which will result in lower marginal utility.
Another interesting effect occurs as the minimum withdrawal rates cross above uncon-
strained optimal drawdown. When the retiree is forced to withdraw more from his account
than is optimal to consume, the marginal utility drops significantly. This occurs approxi-
mately at age 75 for both single and couple households, though slightly later for less wealthy
households. The marginal utility received from consumption is essentially zero after this age,
thus the utility consists of an increasingly larger proportion bequest as the retiree ages (and
mortality risk increases). This switch occurs where the bottom black area starts to increase
towards the right bound, as it moves from utility from consumption to utility from bequest
(this is more apparent for couple households in Figure 5). These characteristics are very
similar to the surface generated by the old rules when minimum withdrawals are enforced.
In fact, once the minimum withdrawal rates exceed the optimal drawdown, they become
nearly identical. The difference is therefore only for the initial years of retirement, ages 65-
80, because of how the income-test is constructed. In regards to the 2017 asset test changes,
the buffer feature are slightly stronger, but the characteristics are similar to the 2015 rules,
hence are not shown in a graph. With the old rules, the income-test is binding most of
the time, whereas with the new rules it binds for only roughly one-third of the partial Age
Pension — and even less than that for homeowners.
3.3 Optimal housing allocation
The decision variable for the allocation of assets into a family home is expected to change
slightly due to the increased focus on assets in the means-test. The decision made at the
time of retirement shows that under the new policy rules it is optimal to invest slightly less
than under the old rules, up to a total wealth level of approximately $735,000 for single
households and $1,155,000 for couple households (see Figure 9). This would leave approxi-
mately $144,000 and $247,000 respectively as liquid wealth. Households with total wealth
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above this level, meanwhile, are recommended to invest slightly more. These allocation de-
cisions leave liquid wealth just below the thresholds for receiving full Age Pension, and the
difference in the housing curves can be explained by the income-test changes. For a given
wealth, the new rules provide the retiree with more partial pension than with the old rules.
Early in retirement, the optimal consumption is high which causes the income-test to bind
under the old rules. The new rules alternatively have a deemed income for the income-test
that is much lower than before, which ultimately results in more partial Age Pension. The
effect decreases 10-15 years into retirement, but when the minimum withdrawal rates exceed
unconstrained optimal drawdown at older age ranges, the same occurs again. This can be
seen by comparing plots in column 1 or 2 with column 3 in Figure 1 or Figure 2. Since
a certain level of liquid wealth under the new rules will lead to higher expected utility, it
is optimal to allocate slightly more in housing compared with the old rules (as long as the
liquid wealth is not very low) to benefit from receiving partial Age Pension. The effects of
the 2017 asset test changes are very similar and cannot be distinguished visually from the
2015 policy, hence have been left out in Figure 9.
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4 Conclusions
In this paper, we adapt the stochastic retirement utility model from Andreasson et al. (2016)
to implement the Age Pension policy changes from 2015, which affect all Allocated Pension
accounts opened after January 1st 2015. These changes affect the treatment of income
for the Age Pension income-test, and lead to different optimal decisions for consumption,
investments, and housing. We also evaluate the new policy rules with the current Age
Pension asset-test, as well as the planned asset-test adjustments for 2017.
We find that optimal consumption only applies early in retirement, as minimum with-
drawal rates exceed unconstrained optimal drawdown rates between ages 75-85, depending
on wealth level. Only before this point, it is possible to plan withdrawals in order maximize
utility, but these possibilities are almost nonexistent under the new policy rules compared
with previous. Optimal drawdown equals minimum withdrawal after age 85 (as it becomes
a binding lower constraint for withdrawal), thus the new and old policy rules are identical
after this age. That said, since the income-test tends to bind for the old rules while the
asset-test dominates for the new rules, the retiree will now tend to receive more partial
pension under the optimal withdrawal rules. Even with the steeper taper rate that will be
introduced in January 2017, the retiree will receive a more generous Age Pension compared
with the old policy.
Since income (which was considered drawdown from the allocated pension account) is
now replaced by deemed income, the assets are means-tested twice, which means risky asset
allocation becomes more sensitive. The changes in optimal risky asset allocation over time
16
and wealth are similar to the old rules, but the changes are slightly more aggressive and
depend on marginal utility from consumption and bequest, as well as the level of buffering
against investment losses the Age Pension provides. This effect dies off as the minimum
withdrawal rates bind, and the bequest motive becomes more important.
Providing that the retiree’s remaining liquid wealth is close to (or higher) than the
threshold between full and partial Age Pension at the time of retirement, it is optimal to
invest slightly more in housing than before. This will allow the retiree to receive more partial
Age Pension, and to increase his expected utility in the long term. If the retiree instead has
lower total wealth than the threshold, he is alternatively recommended to invest marginally
less than before.
One surprising finding is that a retiree with an income stream where minimum withdrawal
rules are enforced will receive more Age Pension over the course of their lifetime with the
new policy rules. Due to the minimum withdrawal requirement, the drawdown tends to be
higher than what is optimal for most ages, which under the old rules would result in no or
low partial Age Pension. The new rules combined with the current historically low deeming
rates will generate significant Age Pension payments from the same drawdown and wealth
levels. This, in turn, affects both the decision for allocation in housing as well as risky
investments. The government’s goal of reducing incentives for maximizing Age Pension
payments and focusing on maximizing total disposable income is however met - the new
policy is not as sensitive to optimal withdrawal decisions in order to maximize Age Pension
payments as the old policy was.
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